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Why Just Two? 
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights 
and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents 
Melanie B. Jacobs· 
Yet for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite 
advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome 
biologically possible. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Johnson court notes, assisted reproductive technologies (ART) 
make it quite possible to have more than two mothers: the genetic mother, the 
gestational mother, and the intended mother. Similarly, it is possible to have 
two fathers: the sperm donor and the intended father. Thus, when heterosexual 
and homosexual couples use ART to have children there are more than two 
potential parents. Determining which individuals should have legal status has 
become rather complicated. 
Many families today no longer comport with the traditional nuclear family 
model of one mother and one father. As the law responds to these societal 
changes by expanding the legal definition of parent beyond biology and 
adoption, recognition of multiple parents looms on the horizon.! Children born 
through ART have more than two potential parents, such as genetic sperm or 
egg donors, gestational birth mothers, and a variety of functional parents such 
as stepparents, foster parents, and other caregivers. 
Determining a child's legal mother and father was not historically 
difficult: the birth mother was the legal mother and her husband, pursuant to 
• Associate Professor of Law, MSU College of Law. My apprecIatIOn to 
Professor Leslie Harris for organizing the "Delivering Nurturance" conference in 
March 2006 and suggesting this symposium issue. I am grateful for the stimulating 
comments and questions I received from Leslie Harris, Nancy Dowd, June Carbone, 
and Marsha Garrison at that conference. 
I See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 
VA. L. REv. 879, 945 (1984) ("The key disadvantages of broadening access to 
parenthood are that it may increase the number of adults making claim to a child and 
enhance the indeterminacy that already exists in child custody law."); see also Leslie 
Joan Harris, Reconsidering Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 
482. In advocating for the adoption of a functional parent test, Professor Harris notes 
that a potential consequence of her "proposal is the possibility that a child might have 
more than two legal parents .... " Harris, supra, at 482. 
309 
HeinOnline -- 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 310 2007
310 JOURNAL OF LAW & F AMIL Y STUDIES [Vol. 9 
the marital presumption, was the child's father. 2 For a child born out of 
wedlock, only the mother was a legal parent. 3 Improved assisted reproductive 
technology techniques and the continued increase of nontraditional families 
challenge the traditional two-parent paradigm which has been a bulwark of 
family law. A simple "who's your mommy?" or "who's your daddy?" is not 
always a simple question nor one with a singular answer. The traditional one 
mother/one father nuclear family paradigm has been steadily decreasing.4 As 
different types of family formations emerge, however, judges are constrained 
by the two-parent paradigm doctrine to "fit" these new families into old molds. 
For example, in the past decade or so, doctrines such as intentional and 
functional parenthood have been applied by courts to legalize the co-parentage 
of a child by a nonbiological gay or lesbian partnerS as well as to determine 
parentage when heterosexual couples use ART.6 A nonbiological or nonmarital 
parent who is granted parental recognition thus enters the two-parent paradigm. 
In so doing, courts still assure the continuity of the binary system. 
Significantly, however, oftentimes courts will not grant full parental status to a 
nonbiological or nonmarital parent and will grant only partial visitation rights.? 
2 David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. 1. COMPo L. 125, 127 
(2006). 
3 Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social 
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 816 (2006). 
4 See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH ApPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 361 (3d ed. 2006) ("The traditional nuclear family is on the 
decline. Currently, less than one in four families fits this family type.") (citing BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REpORTS, FAMILY 
AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf). 
5 See Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal 
Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 433 passim (2005) (arguing that intentional 
parentage should be used to adjudicate maternity for nonlegal lesbian mothers); 
Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating 
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUfF. L. REv. 341, 354-66 (2002) 
[hereinafter Adjudicating Maternity] (reviewing several cases in which courts 
preserved the relationship between the nonbiological mother and her child using a 
functional analysis); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 639-
40 (2002) (discussing cases in which intentional parenthood is applied and noting that 
the doctrine is most often applied to married couples who have used assisted 
reproduction but arguing for a broader application of intentional parenthood). 
6 E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (in determining whether 
the genetic egg donor mother or the gestational surrogate mother was the child's legal 
mother, the court relied on the genetic mother's intention to have and raise the child in 
holding the genetic mother is the legal mother). 
7 Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, at 349-50 (discussing problems 
nonbiological lesbian co-parents face in having their legal status recognized and their 
treatment as a third party legal stranger); see also Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1317 
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One reason for the disparity of rights is the emphasis on parental rights 
and the legal and constitutional importance of legal parentage.8 Legal parents 
enjoy considerable protection from state and third-party interference.9 While 
legal parents bear the obligations of parentage, such as food, shelter, clothing, 
medical care, and the like, legal parents also enjoy all of the benefits of 
parentage, such as custody and influencing the child's educational, moral, and 
religious development. lo 
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the rights of parents to 
control the care and custody of their children without interference from third 
parties, including the state. II When the traditional two-parent family was the 
norm, it was simpler to determine the third-party outsider: the grandparent, 
stepparent, foster parent, and so forth. As the traditional one mother/one father 
model declines and other family models increase, the line between a traditional 
parent and third party has become blurred. Determining who is a legal parent 
and who is merely a third party without parental rights, or only partially 
recognized rights, is increasingly litigated. 12 Oftentimes a nonlegal lesbian 
parent or stepparent will seek to protect her relationship with a child she has 
helped to raise. 13 There, the party's goal is to have parental recognition, versus 
unprotected third-party status. Alternatively, some parents wish to ensure that 
someone who might otherwise have parental rights, like a sperm or egg donor, 
(Conn. 1998) (finding that woman who used surrogate to bear child was not the child's 
legal mother and remanding case to determine whether woman should be granted 
custody). 
8 Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, at 348-49 (discussing parental 
autonomy and the tension between legal parents and nonlegal parents who are treated 
as third-party legal strangers in custody disputes). 
9 Id.; see infra Part II discussing Parental Autonomy. 
10 Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, at 347. 
11 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (holding that, as applied 
to a situation where paternal grandparents sought more visitation with children than to 
which the mother agreed, a Washington statute that permitted any person to petition for 
visitation rights with a child at any time unconstitutionally infringed on a mother's 
fundamental right to raise her children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972) 
("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental 
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition."). 
12 See Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, at 354-69 (reviewing cases 
in which a nonbiological lesbian co-parent sought to establish and preserve her legal 
relationship with her child). 
13 E.g., Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,435-36 (Wis. 1995) (holding that a 
lesbian co-parent was a psychological parent and could maintain an action for 
visitation with her nonbiological child); Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003) (discussing Indiana statute which permits de facto custodians (in this case, 
a stepfather) to establish custodial and/or visitation rights). 
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remains a third party without any parental standing. 14 Thus, maintaining the 
two-parent paradigm may result both in the inclusion of some nontraditional 
parents and the exclusion of persons who would historically have been deemed 
a parent. 
In recent decades, scholars have undertaken an examination of parenthood 
from the outside in: we have endeavored to include nontraditional parents 
within the traditional strictures of parenthood to provide protection both for 
parent and child. Some courts have positively responded to these arguments 
and used equitable parental doctrines to preserve relationships for nonlegal 
parents and children. 15 I have previously advocated for the expansion of 
parenthood beyond biology and adoption and maintain that position here. 16 My 
premise, however, is that parenthood should be re-examined from the inside 
out: that we should rethink and perhaps reshape the roles and responsibilities 
of parenthood. We need to (when appropriate) disaggregate the many aspects 
of parenthood to permit all of the relevant adults to participate in a child's life, 
while still maintaining continuity and stability for the child. And, when 
appropriate, we need to recognize that more than two individuals can assume 
the many roles and obligations that traditional parentage has entailed, and 
children can benefit from the legal recognition of all of those individuals as 
parents. 
The word "parent" evokes a series of images of an adult assisting a child 
with a myriad of tasks: making dinner; helping with homework; driving to 
school, the doctor, piano lessons, sports practice; and many more daily, routine 
tasks. Yet, not all parents engage in those tasks. Some parents are a source of 
financial support for their children but have little or minimal contact with the 
children and provide no emotional support. Other parents are primary 
caretakers who do not work outside the home and do not provide traditional 
financial support. Finally, some persons are adjudicated a parent and yet have 
no contact with their child at all. From a legal standpoint, recognition as 
"parent" entitles the individual to pursue all the benefits of parentage and may 
require the individual to assume all of the duties. Oftentimes, though, more 
14 For example, the Uniform Parentage Act provides that "[a] donor is not a 
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§ 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (2000). 
15 See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a 
woman was estopped from attacking the validity of a parentage stipulation jointly 
signed and filed by her and her lesbian partner, and that permitting an attack on the 
judgment's validity would contravene public policy that favors a child having two 
parents). 
16 See Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, passim (encouraging courts 
to apply the UPA to adjudicate maternity for nonbiologicallesbian co-parents); Jacobs, 
Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, supra 
note 5, passim (advocating that courts use the doctrines of intentional and functional 
parenthood to adjudicate parentage for nontraditional parents); Jacobs, My Two Dads, 
supra note 3, passim (advocating for recognition of both biological and social fathers). 
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than two individuals share the duties of parentage. What if three (or more) 
individuals financially and emotionally support the child and fully agree that 
all three should be active participants in the child's life-why not recognize 
the legal parent-child relationship for all three parents? In addition, what place 
is there for a biological parent who has no intended or functional parenting 
role? Whether biology provides an automatic entitlement to parental status or 
whether biological parenthood can be excluded altogether as a legal basis of 
parentage is a source of current debate. 
I suggest that disaggregating and redefining parentage may allow for 
recognition of all the relevant adults in a child's life, yet not grant equal 
parental rights to all individuals, unless specifically agreed upon. A scheme of 
relative rights, depending upon the adult's relationship with and contributions 
to the child should enable multiple parentage to work.17 As Professor Alison 
Young has argued in an article in which she challenges the paradigm of the 
nuclear family, "[a] more inclusive notion of family does not mean simply 
adding to the number of 'parents' which law and society recognize. The 
challenge is to approach the task with a greater degree of imagination, so that 
different types of degrees of contribution and potential contribution may be 
fostered.,,18 
Courts have started to move beyond traditional parentage recognition, by 
legalizing parental relationships for nonbiological lesbian and gay parents as 
well as establishing parentage for heterosexual couples who use ART and 
either have no genetic connection to their child or one party has no genetic 
connection. Because of the greater acceptance of nonbiological and 
nonadoptive parents, the time is ripe to consider multiple parents; in this 
Article, I specifically examine multiple parentage for families formed through 
use of ART. Families formed with ART encompass several types of scenarios 
in which to apply multiple parenthood, and I hope that the exploration of these 
varied scenarios can in future writings be applied to other contexts, such as 
adoptive families and stepfamilies. 19 
In this Article, I will briefly address three issues that affect the 
implementation of multiple parenthood. First, I discuss the issue of parental 
autonomy and illustrate the difficulty that persons without legal recognition of 
their parenthood encounter in seeking visitation or custody with a child they 
have created or functionally parented. Second, I examine the current ways in 
which parentage is established. As courts move beyond strictly defining a 
17 Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 3, at 852-56; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LA W OF F AMIL Y DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA nONS § 2.09 (2000) 
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (discussed infra at Part IV.B). 
18 Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm 
of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 505,516 (1998). 
19 In a previous article, I advocated for the recognition of mUltiple fathers when a 
child has both a social father and biological father. Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 
3, passim. I wrote that I hoped to begin a larger dialogue about multiple parentage, and 
this Article is the next step in that larger process. 
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parent by biology or adoption and recognize functional and intentional 
parenthood, more than two people may have legitimate claims of parenthood 
yet current law adheres to a two-parent paradigm. Coupled with the parental 
autonomy principles noted earlier, nonparents are essentially legal strangers to 
children they may have helped to raise or create. Continued reliance on the 
two-parent paradigm unnecessarily eliminates many caring individuals from 
children's lives. Finally, I discuss some of the practical realities and 
implications of multiple parenthood, specifically some of the concerns of 
"managing" multiple parenthood. In highlighting these three issues, I hope to 
encourage further dialogue and research that helps us better understand 
children's needs and interests. 
II. PARENTAL PREFERENCE: THE RIGHTS OF 
LEGAL PARENTS VERSUS THIRD PARTIES 
Legal parentage entitles a parent to all the rights, responsibilities, 
privileges, and benefits of parentage. Lack of parental status often renders 
other adults as legal strangers without standing or recourse to establish or 
maintain a relationship with a child.20 The dichotomy between the rights of 
parents and nonparents is well established in American jurisprudence. Parents 
are presumed to act in the best interests of their children and are protected from 
most governmental interference regarding the care, custody, and control of 
their children.21 The Supreme Court has recognized the concepts of parental 
autonomy and privacy for nearly a century. Beginning in Meyer v. Nebraska, 
the Court has firmly stated that liberty includes "the right of the individual ... 
to establish a home and bring up children .... ,,22 In subsequent cases, the 
Court reaffirmed both a "private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter,,23 and parental autonomy as a fundamental right under the Constitution.24 
In 2000, the Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the issue of parental 
autonomy. In Troxel v. Granville, the Court held unconstitutional as applied a 
Washington statute that permitted any person to petition for visitation with a 
child at any time?5 Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel lived together and had 
two children out of wedlock.26 When their relationship ended, Brad moved in 
with his parents and continued to visit with his daughters on weekends at his 
20 See Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 5, at 348-49. 
21 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
22 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
23 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
24 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("A 
host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 
(1923) ... and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. 534-35 (1925) ... have 
consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter. ,,, (extensive internal citations omitted). 
25 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-67. 
26 [d. at 60. 
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parent's home. 27 Two years after his separation from Tommie, Brad committed 
suicide.28 His parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel, continued to see his daughters 
but after some time, Tommie sought to limit their visitation to one weekend 
per month.29 The Troxels, unhappy with limited visitation, filed suit pursuant 
to the above-mentioned statute30 and the trial court granted their request. The 
Washington Supreme Court overturned the trial court decision.31 
On appeal, Justice O'Connor quickly affirmed the principle of parental 
autonomy: "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case-the interests of parents 
in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.,,32 The Court found that 
the Washington visitation statute was "breathtakingly broad.,,33 As interpreted 
by the plurality, the statute gave courts the power to "disregard and overturn 
any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third 
party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the 
judge's determination of the child's best interests.,,34 Finding that the trial 
judge had indeed disregarded Tommie's wishes and instead substituted his 
judgment regarding the children's best interests,35 the Court held that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied.36 
The Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility of third parties 
bringing visitation actions in appropriate circumstances. 
Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of § 26.10.160(3) and 
the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not 
consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington 
Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental 
27 Id. 
281d. 
29Id. at 60-61. 
30Id. at 61. The statute provided that "'[a]ny person may petition the court for 
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The 
court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best 
interest of the child whether or not there has been a change of circumstances.'" !d. 
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994)). 
31 In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21,29 (Wash. 1998). 
32 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
33 Id. at 67 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3)). 
34 Id. (emphasis in original). 
35 I d. at 72. Reviewing the trial court's opinion, Justice O'Connor quoted the trial 
judge's personal views in ordering the grandparent visitation. In ordering a week of 
summer visitation, the judge wrote, "I look back on some personal experiences .... 
We always spent as kids a week with one set of grandparents and another set of 
grandparents, and it happened to work out in our family that it turned out to be an 
enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out." ld. 
361d. at 75 ("We therefore hold that the application of § 26.10.160(3) to Granville 
and her family violated her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of her daughters."). 
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visitation statutes to include a showing of hann or potential hann to the 
child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need 
not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the 
visitation context. 37 
Unfortunately, however, the Court provided little guidance for state courts 
and legislatures regarding the future rights of nonparents. By refraining from 
holding that the Washington visitation statute was per se unconstitutional, the 
Court did not preclude all nonparent visitation claims when there is not a 
showing of harm. The Court did not clarify, however, under what 
circumstances a nonparent's claim should be granted.38 
Moreover, the plurality focused on the rights of parents but did not 
discuss the rights of children to maintain relationships with persons who have 
been active care givers. In his dissent, Justice Stevens addressed the issue 
passed on by the plurality and noted that there is no basis in the Court's 
previous jurisprudence to suggest that the only way in which to interfere with a 
parent's liberty interest is upon a showing of harm.39 Rather, Stevens observed 
that children likely have a liberty interest in preserving intimate relationships, 
just as adults d040 but further noted that a child's liberty interest in maintaining 
a relationship is not necessarily on par with the parent's contrary interest.41 
Regardless, Stevens concluded that 
[w]e should recognize that there may be circumstances in which a child has 
a stronger interest at stake than mere protection from serious hann caused 
by the tennination of visitation by a "person" other than a parent. The 
almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-
changing society strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a 
constitutional rule that treats a biological parent's liberty interest in the care 
and supervision of her child as an isolated right that may be exercised 
b· ·1 42 ar Itran y. 
It is this tension between parents' rights, children's rights, and third 
37Id. at 73. 
38 Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where 
Should States Draw the Line?, 32 RUTGERS L.l. 784, 786 (2001): 
Before the Troxel decision, the overwhelming majority of states-unlike 
Washington-had adopted various criteria to limit the availability of 
visitation for nonparents. Troxel makes clear that all states must do so, but 
its fragmented, fact-specific holding falls far short of providing a blueprint 
of what those criteria must be. As a result, the states are left largely to their 
own devices to determine where to draw the line on which nonparents are 
entitled to visitation and which are not. 
39 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85-86 (Stevens, 1. dissenting). 
40Id. at 88-89. 
41Id. at 89. 
42 !d. at 90. 
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parties' rights-and the superiority of parents' rights-that makes the current 
regime particularly troublesome for children and third parties. 
Addressing this tension and the ambiguity of the plurality opinion, 
Professor Sally Goldfarb notes the importance of determining the role the 
nonparent played in the child's life as a guide to when the nonparent's 
visitation claim should be recognized.43 In clarifying the potential pool of 
nonparents who may have legitimate claims for visitation, Goldfarb advocates 
that courts draw the line "at the point where a given adult has acted in a 
capacity of a parent to the child.,,44 In advocating that Troxel should not 
foreclose legal recognition of lesbian and gay parents, Professor Nancy 
Polikoff encourages courts "to see the difference between petitioners who have 
functioned as parents. . . and petitioners who have not, such as the Troxel 
grandparents. Further, courts should accord parental status, rather than third-
party status, to legally unrecognized lesbian and gay parents.,,45 Her statement 
addresses the core of the difficulty presented by strict adherence to parental 
autonomy and transcends the lesbian and gay context: without recognition as a 
legal parent, a person may be seen in the law as a third party or "legal 
stranger,,46 who is not entitled to a relationship with a child with whom the 
individual has fostered a parental relationship. 
Strict adherence to parental autonomy coupled with strict adherence to the 
two-parent paradigm renders many parental figures without legal recognition 
of their status. Broadening the category of individuals who qualify for parental 
recognition expands the pool of individuals who benefit from the parental 
preference.47 In this way, custody and visitation disputes can be reconciled 
within a more traditional framework, akin to the divorce context,48 and the 
issue of standing to bring the custody and/or visitation claim becomes moot. 
As Troxel leaves ambiguous the status of nonparents, it becomes even more 
important to confer legal parental recognition on all individuals who have 
parented a child or who have a potential legal claim upon which to establish 
parentage. In the next section, I discuss how legal parentage is determined. 
43 Goldfarb, supra note 38, at 791. 
44Id. 
45 Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay 
Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 851 (200 I). 
46 Goldfarb, supra note 38, at 787 (noting the traditional view that a nonparent is 
a legal stranger to the child). 
47 Because the doctrine of parental autonomy and preference is restricted to legal 
parents, a broader definition of who qualifies as a legal parent would similarly broaden 
those persons protected by the parental autonomy doctrine. 
48 See Young, supra note 18, at 534. In discussing the trend of awarding joint 
custody to divorced parents, Professor Young notes that "it provided a legal framework 
that recognizes and legitimizes non-exclusive parenting. Joint custody provides one 
model in which parenting is shared across units or households." !d. 
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III. DETERMINING WHO Is A LEGAL PARENT 
The traditional one mother/one father, two-parent paradigm is well 
entrenched in American family law jurisprudence. Typically, legal parentage 
has been established by biology or adoption.49 Until the advent of reproductive 
technologies, motherhood was most simple to determine: the birth mother was 
the biological, hence legal, mother. 50 Parentage for children born into a marital 
relationship has been simple to determine: the child's legal parents are the wife 
and husband. Pursuant to the marital presumption of paternity, the woman's 
husband was presumed the child's legal father, even if he was not, in fact, the 
child's biological father. 51 A child born to an unmarried woman had only one 
legal parent, the mother. 52 Paternity laws provide for a similar two-parent 
paradigm for children born out of wedlock; according to its Prefatory Note, the 
Uniform Parentage Act (UP A) was promulgated to equalize the rights of 
nonmarital and marital children and provide that nonmarital children have two 
legal parents to provide emotional and financial support.53 Under the UP A, a 
man who is either the biological or social father of the child can be established 
as the child's legal father. 54 
49 Biology as the basis for legal parentage is discussed more fully in the main 
text. 
Parentage may also be established through adoption: historically, a child has been 
"reborn," so to speak, into her new family and the adoptive parents are the legal 
parents and the biological parents no longer have any parental rights and are excluded 
from a further relationship with the child. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 893-94. 
Adoption may be the result of a voluntary process, as when a biological mother 
places a child for adoption at or soon after birth. Adoption may also result from an 
involuntary removal of a child from her parents who have their parental rights 
terminated because of abuse or neglect. Id. at 894-95. The traditional model of 
adoption excluded biological parents completely following the adoption; some courts 
have now considered "open adoption" as a means by which to preserve some contact 
between the child and biological parent(s). See Young, supra note 18, at 537-38. 
50 For example, VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (a)(l), 9B V.L.A. 309 (2000), 
which provides that the mother-child relationship may be established by the woman's 
having given birth to the child, excepting certain situations in which the birth mother is 
a party to a surrogacy agreement as provided for in VP A Article 8. 
51 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 331 (2005). 
52 Id. at 333 ("[V]nmarried biological fathers were not recognized under the 
law."). 
53 See VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B V.L.A. 296 
(Supp. 2006). 
54 See VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (b)(l), 9B V.L.A. 309 (2000) which provides 
multiple bases on which to establish legal fatherhood, such as adjudication of 
fatherhood pursuant to judicial proceedings and reliance on presumptions of paternity 
such as residing with the child and holding oneself out as the father, despite a lack of 
biological connection. Vnif. Parentage Act § 204 (a)(5), 9B V.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
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The traditional, two-parent nuclear family, while still the most prevalent 
family norm in the United States, has been on the decline for several decades. 
Along with the decline of the traditional nuclear family has come a significant 
increase in the use of assisted reproduction, by both heterosexual and 
homosexual couples, to create families. A recent Washington Post article notes 
that donated sperm is used in 80,000 to 100,000 inseminations each year; that 
in 2003, at least 15,000 in vitro fertilization procedures were performed with 
donated eggs; and that more than 1,000 babies are born each year through 
surrogacy.55 Furthermore, the number of lesbian and gay households with 
children is increasing.56 Some states permit the gay or lesbian partner of a legal 
parent to adopt the child, thereby imbuing both parents with legal rights but 
many other states do not, often leaving one partner without any legal parental 
status. 57 These societal changes within both the heterosexual and homosexual 
communities complicate parentage determinations. Traditional parentage law 
does not differentiate between a genetic mother and a birth mother nor does it 
provide for two mothers or two fathers. 58 
In fact, strict application of traditional parentage principles may exclude 
from legal recognition persons who would ordinarily be presumed a member of 
a nuclear family. In Doe v. Doe, a man contracted with a surrogate because the 
woman he intended to marry had had a tubal ligation, an attempted reversal of 
which was unsuccessfu1.59 Both parties wanted a child, and the man advertised 
for a surrogate in a local newspaper; the surrogate was impregnated at her 
home, with the man's sperm while both he and the woman were present.60 The 
55 Liza Mundy, It's All in the Genes, Except When It Isn't, WASHINGTON POST" 
Dec. 17,2006, at Bl. 
56 A report prepared by the Human Rights Campaign, analyzing data from the 
2000 census, reveals 601,209 same-sex unmarried partner households in the United 
States, which is a 314% increase from the 1990 census. Furthermore, researchers 
believe the 2000 census still reflects an undercount of gay and lesbian families. DAVID 
M SMITH & GARY 1. GATES, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS, A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF 2000 UNITED STATES CENSUS DATA, A HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN REPORT 1-2 (2001), available at http://www.hrc.org/contentJcontent-
groups/familynetJdocuments/census.pdf 
57 E.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (holding that 
Massachusetts' adoption statute permits a lesbian couple to jointly adopt the child of 
the biological mother without terminating the biological mother's parental rights); In 
re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that a 
woman could adopt the biological children of her lesbian partner by broadly construing 
the stepparent provisions to the adoption statute). 
58 E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) ("California law, like 
nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood."). 
59 710 A.2d 1297, 1302 (Conn. 1998). 
60 Id. As the court noted, "Both parties desired to have children, although the 
defendant [man] was determined to have a child with or without the plaintiffs 
[woman] cooperation." Id. 
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man and woman were married four months into the surrogate's pregnancy.61 
The surrogate went to doctors' visits under the wife's name and was even 
checked into the hospital under the wife's name, and the wife was listed as the 
child's mother on the birth certificate.62 The surrogate "turned the child over to 
the [wife] and the [husband], 'who nurtured and raised the child with no 
further participation by the surrogate mother. ",63 Almost eight years after the 
child's birth, the wife filed for divorce and the court was asked to consider the 
issue of whether the wife is the child's legal parent and entitled to custody. 64 
Despite the surrogate's termination of parental rights, the court refused to 
recognize the wife as the child's legal mother; instead, the wife was granted 
custody pursuant to a third-party statute.65 Even after Troxel, this decision 
would likely have come out the same way, as the mother had had primary 
physical custody of the child for the six years the case was litigated.66 
Relegating the wife to third-party status, however, made her claim more 
difficult; and had the litigation not lasted so long, her rights as a third party 
may have been subordinated to the husband's, given his legal parental status.67 
The Doe court's refusal to recognize the wife as the child's mother 
demonstrates a rigid adherence to traditional defining parentage by biology and 
adoption and a possible unwariness of opening the door to mUltiple parentage. 
The reality is that the child in Doe had three potential legal parents: a 
biological surrogate mother, a biological and caregiver father, and a caregiver 
mother. Since the surrogate had terminated her parental rights, this result 
seems particularly absurd, as there was room within the traditional two-parent 
61 !d. 
62Id. 
[T]hroughout the prenatal period the defendant accompanied [the 
surrogate] to doctors' appointments, where she used the plaintiffs name, 
social security number and other statistical data regarding the plaintiff. 
Also, on occasion the plaintiff would accompany the defendant and the 
surrogate to the doctors' appointments, and on occasion would stuff a 
pillow in her clothing to simulate the appearance of being pregnant. Id. 
63 Id. at 1303. Furthermore, the court noted at the outset of the opinion that the 
surrogate mother's parental rights were terminated. Id. at 1300. 
64 Id. at 1301-02. 
65 !d. at 1317. After reviewing the applicable statutes and case law, the court 
concluded that "the plaintiff is not a parent of the child within the well established 
definition of that term in our marital dissolution law; ... she is, however, a third party 
who comes well within the ambit of [the applicable statute] for consideration as a third 
party claimant to custody of the child." Id. 
66Id. at 1301. 
67 !d. at 1323. Under Connecticut law, in custody fights between a parent and a 
nonparent, "there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be 
in the custody of the parent, which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it 
would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody." CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West 2003). 
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paradigm to recognize the wife as a legal mother. The court, however, 
specifically rejected doctrines of equitable parenthood.68 
The law is slowly responding to societal changes and the increased use of 
ART. Other courts have been amenable to using equitable parental doctrines. 
Some courts have used doctrines of functional parenthood69 or intentional 
parenthood70 to recognize the parental status of a nonbiological or nonadoptive 
parent. Some states have begun to apply the UP A to recognize the legal 
parental status of a lesbian partner.71 The revised UP A and the ALI Principles 
both contemplate a wider array of parents than biological and adoptive parents. 
In different ways, each recognizes changing medical technology and social 
mores that permit family formation beyond the traditional one-mother/one-
father paradigm. 
Significantly, the UP A is drafted so as to provide two legal parents for a 
child, even if those parents are not biological parents. The UP A itself was 
revised in 2000, with additional revisions in 2002, and attempts to resolve 
some of the existing murkiness in parentage law, especially concerning the use 
68 !d. at 1317-18. In rejecting equitable parenthood, the court wrote: 
[W]e are not persuaded that it would be wise to employ the equitable parent 
doctrine .... It is true that the doctrine has considerable emotional appeal, 
because it permits a court, in a particularly compelling case, to conclude 
that, despite the lack of biological or adoptive ties to the child, the deserving 
adult nonetheless may be determined to be the child's parent. This appeal 
may be enhanced in a given case because the best interests of the child, if 
determined irrespective of the otherwise invalid claim of parentage, may 
point in that direction. That doctrine, however, would lack the procedural 
and substantive safeguards provided to natural parents and the child by the 
adoption statutes. In addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which 
necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage 
after the facts of the case have been determined, would eliminate the 
significant degree of certainty regarding who is and who is not a child's 
parent that our jurisprudence supplies. 
Id. at n.46. 
69 E.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (holding that a former 
same-sex partner could prove legal parentage by establishing a de facto or 
psychological parental relationship.). 
70 E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (holding that a married couple that had contracted with a sperm donor, egg 
donor, and gestational surrogate, were the child's legal parents because they caused the 
child's birth with the intent to parent). 
71 See Elisa B v. Emily B., 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a woman 
who supported her lesbian partner's use of artificial insemination and received the 
children into her home and held them out as her children is a parent under the Uniform 
Parentage Act); K.M. v. E.G. 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (holding that woman who 
donated her ova to lesbian partner who bore the children is a parent under California's 
version of the UP A, as her genetic relationship constitutes evidence of the mother and 
child relationship, just as the partner's giving birth to the children also evidences a 
mother-child relationship). 
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of assisted reproductive technologies.72 Essentially, the UPA broadens the 
ways in which parentage may be established, but eliminates biological parents 
from the family in numerous instances. For example, the UPA recognizes that 
a couple with fertility problems may use a sperm or egg donor for a pregnancy, 
yet the UP A specifies that the sperm and/or egg donors are not legal parents.73 
The UP A also includes provisions governing the validity of gestational 
surrogacy agreements and, if the agreement is approved, excludes the surrogate 
from a parenting role.74 These changes are helpful to couples who use ART as 
they can ensure their legal parenthood, although the ramifications of entirely 
removing biological parents from the family unit has generated considerable 
debate.75 
72 Articles 7 and 8 specifically apply to ART. The comments to Article 7 
explains, in part: 
[d]uring the last thirty years, medical science has developed a wide array of 
assisted reproductive technology... which have enabled childless 
individuals and couples to become parents. [Because t]housands of children 
are born in the United States each year as the result of ART[,] ... [i]t is 
necessary for the new Act to clarify definitively the parentage of a child 
born under these circumstances. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Article 7 comment, 9B U.L.A. Supp. 49 (Supp. 2002). 
Article 8 specifically addresses the issue of gestational agreements, permitting the 
use of gestational agreements and providing a framework for enforcing the agreements. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Article 8, 9B U.L.A. 360 (2000); see infra note 71. 
73 As the law expands the traditional notion of parenthood to encompass 
nontraditional parents and brings them within the two-parent paradigm and gives them 
protections as a parent, rather than third-party status, the law has also begun to exclude 
otherwise "traditional biological" parents, such as sperm and egg donors. The UPA 
provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT' 702, 9B u.L.A. 355 (2000). The Comment 
further explains: 
If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this section 
clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not the parent of the 
resulting child. The donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be 
sued and required to support the resulting child. In sum, donors are 
eliminated from the parental equation .... 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (Supp. 2006). 
74 UPA section 801 authorizes gestational agreements for married or unmarried 
couples. The provision provides, in part: 
(a) A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, 
a donor or the donors, and the intended parents may enter into a written 
agreement providing that: ... 
(2) the prospective gestational mother ... and the donors relinquish 
all rights and duties as parents of a child conceived through assisted 
reproduction; and 
(3) the intended parents become the parents of the child. 
75 See infra Part IV.C. 
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The American Law Institute has also responded to shifts in family form 
by suggesting multiple categories of parents: legal parents, parents by estoppel, 
and de facto parents. 76 A legal parent is defined through customary state 
definitions, such as by biology or adoption.77 A parent by estoppel is one who, 
with the agreement of a legal parent or parents, has lived with the child since 
birth, or for at least two years if not since birth, and has assumed full parenting 
responsibilities. 78 A de facto parent is also a person who has lived with the 
child for at least two years and, with the agreement of the legal parent or as a 
result of the legal parent failing to perform caretaking functions, has regularly 
cared for the child.79 With its inclusion of parent by estoppel and de facto 
parent designations, the ALI specifically contemplates legal parenthood for 
two gay or lesbian parents as well as opens the door to multiple parents.80 
76 ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.03(1) (2002). 
77 "A legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under other state 
law." Id. § 2.03(1 )(a). 
78 See Id. § 2.03( I )(b). Section 2.03(1 )(b) of the ALI PRINCIPLES states: 
A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, is (i) 
obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child 
for at least two years and (A) over that period had a reasonable good-faith 
belief that he was the child's biological father, based on marriage to the 
mother or on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted 
parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and (B) if some time 
thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make reasonable, good-
faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child's father; or (iii) lived with 
the child since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting 
agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, 
both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and 
responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition as a parent is in the 
child's best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for at least two years, 
holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, 
pursuant to an agreement with the child's parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition of the 
individual as a parent is in the child's best interests. 
79 !d. § 2.03(1)(c). Section 2.03(1)(c) of the ALI PRINCIPLES states: 
A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, (i) 
lived with the child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial 
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-
child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any 
legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a 
majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed 
a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with 
whom the child primarily lived. 
80 Id. § 2.03, illus. iii. Illustration iii of § 2.03 of the ALI PRINCIPLES states, in 
part: 
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Interestingly, despite greater acceptance of ART, nontraditional families, 
and broadening definitions of parenthood, courts continue to cling to the 
traditional two-parent paradigm. For example, although ART may involve 
multiple adults who would ordinarily have a claim to legal parentage, courts 
apply the various doctrines to ensure that a child has two, and only two, legal 
parents.8 ! In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court had to 
determine maternity of a child who was born using a surrogate.82 Mark and 
Crispina Calvert contracted with Anna Johnson to act as a gestational 
surrogate; Crispina had had a hysterectomy but produced eggs, and an embryo 
created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg was implanted in Anna.83 Anna 
ultimately sought to keep the baby and the court had to decide which woman 
was the child's legal mother. The court specifically noted that California law 
recognizes only one mother and determined that Crispina, because of her intent 
to procreate and raise the child as her own, was the child's legal-and only-
mother.84 In reaching its decision, the court wrote: 
We decline to accept the contention of amicus curiae the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) that we should find the child has two mothers. 
Even though rising divorce rates have made mUltiple parent arrangements 
common in our society, we see no compelling reason to recognize such a 
situation here. The Cal verts are the genetic and intending parents of their 
son and have provided him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and 
nurturing home. To recognize parental rights in a third party with whom the 
Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after the child's birth 
would diminish Crispina's role as mother.85 
The opinion emphasizes the binary, "all or nothing" approach to 
parentage. In deciding on one mother and two parents, there was no place for 
This Paragraph contemplates the situation of two cohabiting adults who 
undertake to raise a child together, with equal rights and responsibilities as 
parents. Adoption is the clearer, and thus preferred, legal avenue for 
recognition of such parent-child relationships, but adoption is sometimes not 
legally available or possible, especially if ... the adults are both women, or 
both men. 
81 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282-83, 291 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). In this case, five people were responsible for the birth of the child: the 
egg donor, semen donor, gestational surrogate, and the married couple who contracted 
with the parties and intended to parent the child. Id. at 282. After the pregnancy, the 
husband filed for divorce and disclaimed parentage of the child. Id. The appeals court 
determined that the married couple, who caused the child's birth by their conduct and 
intended to be her parents, were the legal parents of the child. Id. at 291. 
82 851 P. 2d 776,778-79 (Cal. 1993). 
83 Id. at 778. 
84 I d. at 781-82. 
85 !d. at 781 & n.8 (emphasis added). 
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Anna at all. 86 Disaggregating parentage to endow individuals with parental 
rights that better correspond to their relationship with the child would enable 
families to preserve all relevant parental relationships while not creating too 
much intrusion into the primary family unit. 
IV. RECOGNIZING MUL TIPLE PARENTS FOR FAMILIES WHO U SE ART 
Increasingly, there are situations in which children are actively parented 
by more than two adults, yet only two have full legal recognition as a parent. 
Additionally, children born through ART often have more than two potential 
parents.87 In order to consider multiple parentage, it seems appropriate to 
rethink parentage from the inside out: what does "parent" mean? 
Often, a legal parent engages in the full panoply of parental 
responsibilities, such as providing support, shelter, medical care, education and 
benefits from a relationship with the child and the opportunity to influence the 
child's social, educational, religious, and moral development. Other "legal 
parents" are parents in name only; they provide no financial or emotional 
support (or only provide child support pursuant to garnishment of wages), nor 
do they have any interaction with the child. Still other persons, such as 
nonbiological lesbian mothers, engage in the responsibilities of parentage and 
enjoy many benefits yet have no legal status as parents and thus enjoy no legal 
protections of their relationships with the children they have parented; those 
children also enjoy no protection over similar relationships that they may have 
formed. 
Based on current legal approaches, it is also possible that people who 
would historically have been legal parents, such as birth mothers or biological 
fathers, have no legal status because of surrogacy agreements or statutes 
concerning sperm donation. By disaggregating the strands of parentage, it 
becomes possible to recognize the many individuals who play a role in the 
child's life. Moreover, identifying these individuals as legal parents protects 
both the adults and children by protecting a greater realm of family autonomy 
and ensures that these parents are not mere third parties without legal parental 
86 Young, supra note 18, at 544. Professor Young explains that the dispute 
between Anna and the Cal verts arose in part because the Cal verts had not purchased an 
insurance policy for Anna, as promised. Id. at 543 (citation omitted). Professor Young 
notes that "the legal framework transformed (and arguably distorted) these problems 
into a question of rights over the child's custody ... [and 0 ]nce the parties framed the 
issue in terms of exclusive parenting rights, the inevitable inference is that the 'other 
mother' (usually the gestational mother) disappears from view altogether." Id. at 544. 
87 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text which discusses cases where 
courts were asked to determine parentage among several possible individuals. 
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protection.88 As Troxel makes clear, without the protection of parental status, 
third parties may not have their custodial relationships protected.89 
Perhaps the most significant obstacle in recognizing multiple parentage is 
the concern that there will be too many cooks in the kitchen: it is hard enough 
for two parents to agree on the best way in which to raise a child, so how will 
three (or four or more) negotiate the difficulties of custody, visitation, and the 
like.90 By rethinking parentage and its attendant attributes, we cannot only 
recognize multiple parentage but must also recognize the relative rights of 
parents. Thus, a parent who engages in the bulk of daily responsibility for the 
child, and often has the most benefit (from the close contact), should have 
greater rights regarding the raising of the child than a parent who contributes 
less financial and emotional support and has a more tenuous relationship with 
the child. Most importantly, despite the difficulties of managing mUltiple 
parenthood, children will benefit from greater security of maintaining care 
giving relationships and/or knowledge of their genetic identity.91 
In this section, I explore some of the contexts in which multiple 
parenthood can be applied to protect a child and all of the relevant parental 
adults in her life. Then, I briefly discuss some considerations in making 
multiple parenthood work, such as relative rights of the parents. Finally, I note 
that there may be appropriate instances in which to recognize the contributions 
88 See supra Part II (discussing parental autonomy). 
89 Professor David Meyer has observed that even when courts recognize that 
certain nonparent care givers are psychological parents and "may be permitted to 
preserve a 'parent-like' relationship with the child in this way, these care givers 
continue to occupy the status of a nonparent." Partners, Care Givers, and 
Constitutional Substance of Parenthood in RECONCEIVING THE F AMIL Y: CRITIQUE ON 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTES PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISOLUTION 47, 
47-50 (Robin FretweIl Wilson ed., 2006). 
90 See supra note 1. I realize, too, that legal determinations of parentage for more 
than two adults has implications weIl beyond custody, visitation, and support. 
Inheritance and other benefit schemes may be affected. Of interest, however, is the 
Uniform Probate Code section 2-114 which merely states that a parent child 
relationship may be established under the Uniform Parentage Act or applicable state 
law. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998). Moreover, section 2-
114(b) specifies that when a child is adopted by a stepparent, the child stiIl maintains 
the right to inherit through the other biological parent, id. § 2-114(b), 8 u.L.A. 91; so, 
if a child is adopted by her stepfather, she may inherit from her mother, stepfather, and 
biological father. Thus, there is some indication that multiple parentage can also work 
in the inheritance context. 
91 Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and Constitutional Substance of Parenthood in 
RECONCEIVING THE F AMIL Y: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTES 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISOLUTION, supra note 89, at 47, 66 ("[A]lthough 
it cannot be doubted that spreading parental authority among a wider circle of parents 
would carry significant and genuine costs ... these costs must be balanced against the 
benefits to children from the greater continuity and security of care giving 
relationships. ") 
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of some genetic parents, such as sperm and egg donors, without according 
them full parental status. 
A. Recognizing Multiple Parents 
Multiple parentage is not merely academic: there are a number of cases in 
which courts have protected a child's relationship with more than two parental 
figures. The cases are sparse, however, and generally reinforce a two parent 
paradigm coupled with rights for a third party and do not afford full parental 
recognition to all three parties. A legitimate framework of multiple parentage 
would enable more courts to effect a parenting plan that legally recognizes the 
de facto reality of many families. 
In January 2007, an Ontario appeals court moved beyond the exclusive 
realm of the two-parent paradigm and ruled that a child may have three legal 
parents: two mothers and a father. 92 The five-year-old boy has three functional, 
active parents: his biological mother and father, and the biological mother's 
lesbian partner.93 All three adults specifically contemplated a multiple-
parenting arrangement and jointly sought to have legal parentage established 
for the nonbiological lesbian partner.94 Since adoption by the lesbian partner 
would have terminated the rights of the biological father, adoption was not an 
option for the family.95 Although Canada's parentage laws (much like ours) 
discuss parentage in terms of a two-parent paradigm, the Court used its 
equitable, parens patriae authority to establish legal parentage for all three 
adults.96 The court concluded that "[i]t is contrary to [the child's] best interests 
that he is deprived of the legal recognition of the parentage of one of his 
mothers.,,97 Application of the ALI Principles, discussed in the next section, 
would have provided for the same result, because the ALI provides that two 
legal parents may agree that a third individual may assume full parenting 
responsibilities, rendering that individual a parent by estoppe1.98 
American courts have also recognized rights for more than two parents in 
a variety of situations, although the decisions fall short of recognizing three 
legal parents.99 In LaChappelle v. Mitten, a Minnesota appeals court enforced a 
92 A. (A.) v. B. (B.), 2007 CarswellOnt 2,5 (Ont. c.A.). 
93Id. at 2. 
94 !d. at 5. 
95 The court specifically noted that the partner sought a parentage declaration but 
had not applied for an order of adoption because the statute would then cause the 
biological father to lose his status as the child's parent. Id. at 4. 
96Id. at 13. 
97 Id. at 12; see also id. at 13 ("There is no other way to fill this deficiency except 
through the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction."). 
98 See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
99 For example, in Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986), the court refused to recognize de facto parent status for a mother's friend with 
whom she had co-parented the child, and instead, limited her rights to a visitation 
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private agreement which recognized the legal rights of a biological mother, her 
former lesbian partner, and the child's biological father. loo Relying on the 
child's best interests, the court held that it was not unreasonable to enforce an 
agreement that provides for joint legal custody of the child by the biological 
mother, Mitten, and her former lesbian partner, Ohanian, as well as various 
rights for the biological father, LaChappelle. 101 The initial pre-birth agreement 
of the parties provided that "Mitten and Ohanian would have physical and 
legal custody of the child and that LaChappelle and his partner would be 
entitled to a 'significant relationship. ",102 
A year or so after the child's birth, however, the couple terminated 
LaChappelle's visitation. 103 Prior to terminating LaChappelle's visitation 
rights, the couple had successfully petitioned for adoption. l04 LaChappelle 
moved to vacate the adoption and to have his paternity adjudicated,105 and the 
adoption was vacated. 106 Soon thereafter, Mitten and Ohanian ended their 
relationship and Mitten sought sole physical and legal custody as well as 
permission to relocate to a different state. 107 The trial court, concerned that the 
child maintain a relationship with Ohanian and LaChappelle, would not permit 
Mitten to relocate with the child and retain primary physical custody and as a 
result awarded joint legal custody to Ohanian. 108 Upholding the ruling of the 
trial court, the appeals court enforced an agreement whereby LaChappelle did 
not seek joint legal custody, Mitten and Ohanian would share legal custody, 
and "LaChappelle would have various rights to the child. Any rights 
award. However, the court upheld the paternity adjudication and visitation rights for a 
known sperm donor who had visited with child, but denied the donor custodial rights 
and granted sole legal and physical custody to the mother. Id. at 537-38. 
100 LaChappelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
IOI Id. 
102 Id. at 157. 
103Id. 
104Id. 
105Id. 
106 Id. Once the adoption was vacated, the court no longer had to consider 
LaChappelle's paternity request as a request to establish parental rights in a third 
person; instead, only Mitten was a legal parent and by adjudicating paternity for 
LaChappelle, the court comported with the traditional paradigm of one legal mother 
and one legal father. Ohanian was merely a third party. 
107Id. 
108Id. at 160-61. The court found that Ohanian had standing to sue for joint legal 
custody as a third party. Id. at 159. She was not referred to as a parent in the opinion 
nor did the court refer to doctrines of equitable parenthood. This case was decided on 
March 14, 2000, several months before the United States Supreme Court's Troxel 
decision. Post-Troxel, it is unclear whether the Minnesota Court of Appeals would 
have enforced an order of joint legal custody pursuant to the third-party visitation 
statute, especially without conferring parental status on Ohanian. Id. 
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LaChappelle has under the agreement with Mitten and Ohanian are not those 
of a joint legal custodian."I09 
By enforcing the parties' agreements, the court likely acted in the child's 
best interests and ensured the child continued contact with three adults who 
had served in parenting roles. Specifically, denying legal custody to 
LaChappelle seems consistent with the facts: he had not initially requested 
joint legal custody, had not assumed primary custody, and had a smaller 
parenting role than Mitten and Ohanian. Granting Ohanian custodial rights as a 
third party protects her interest in maintaining a relationship with the child, but 
not as well as conferring parental status. Had the trial court not vacated the 
adoption and still permitted LaChappelle to establish his paternity, the court 
would truly have embraced multiple parentage. By denying Ohanian parental 
rights, her interests will always be subordinate to Mitten's, the legal parent, 
and in light of Troxel, could potentially be curtailed further if another custody 
disagreement arises. 
In Thomas S. v. Robin Y., the New York appellate court similarly 
disaggregated the rights of parentage to permit a known sperm donor to 
maintain an action for an order of filiation and visitation.110 Robin was 
inseminated with the sperm of a known donor, Thomas, and gave birth to a 
daughter, Ry.111 Robin and her partner, Sandra R., paid all of the expenses 
associated with Ry's birth and resided together as a family.ll2 Thomas had 
limited visits with Ry for the first few years of her life and then, with Robin 
and Sandra's encouragement, had greater visitation. 113 When R y was nine, 
Thomas sought to establish a parental relationship with Ry, which Robin and 
Sandra considered a breach of their initial agreement. 114 They refused to permit 
visitation for a period and Thomas brought an action for filiation and 
visitation. I IS 
Although testing revealed that Thomas was Ry's biological father, the 
trial court refused to enter an order of paternity, stating that Thomas was an 
outsider attacking the family and, moreover, even if paternity were 
adjudicated, the court would not grant the father custody. 116 The appellate court· 
disagreed with the trial court's conclusions both regarding the paternity 
decision and its emphasis on custody.ll7 The court found that an order of 
109 !d. at 161. The court specifically refuted Mitten's contention that the child had 
three legal custodians. !d. 
110 618 N.Y.S.2d 356,357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
III !d. at 357-58. 
112 !d. at 358. 
113 Id. The court noted that over time, the parties developed a "comfortable 
relationship with one another" and that photos "depict a warm and amicable 
relationship" between Thomas and Ry. Id. 
114 !d. 
liS Id. 
116Id. 
117Id. at 360. 
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paternity did not of itself confer custodial rights, as those are to be determined 
in a later proceeding. 118 Moreover, the court noted that Thomas was not 
seeking custodial rights but visitation and that the "gratuitous interjection of 
custody, in particular, raises the very threat to the relationship between Ry and 
her mothers that [Robin] and the dissent posit in support of termination of 
[Thomas'] parental rights.,,119 
In this manner, the court refuted the all-or-nothing approach to parentage 
and acknowledged that legal recognition of Thomas' paternity would enable 
him to maintain his relationship with Ry.120 While seemingly a recognition of 
parental rights for three parties, the court noted that Sandra had not adopted Ry 
and that the issue of rights for a gay partner vis-a-vis a biological parent were 
not presented. 121 Even though the court certainly recognized the parental role 
Sandra played, she had no legal status as a parent and the court was not asked 
to establish parentage for a third parent. 
A third example in which a court did not confer parental rights on three 
parties is the Baby M surrogacy case. 122 The Stems wanted a child, but 
Elizabeth Stem had multiple sclerosis and feared a pregnancy could be too 
dangerous. 123 The Stems contracted with MaryBeth Whitehead to serve as a 
surrogate. 124 Despite Whitehead's desire to keep the baby, Melissa, after her 
birth, she did tum Melissa over to the Sterns. 125 Shortly thereafter, though, 
Whitehead became very distraught and "stricken with unbearable sadness" and 
requested to take Melissa for one week. 126 The Stems were "surprised and 
frightened" by Whitehead's despair and feared she would act on suicidal 
thoughts, so they gave Melissa to Whitehead for the visit. 127 Whitehead fled 
with Melissa, who was not returned to the Stems for four months. 128 Before 
recovering Melissa, the Stems sought enforcement of the surrogacy contract, 
including a termination of Whitehead's parental rights, and further sought to 
have Mrs. Stem adopt Melissa. 129 After Melissa's reunion with the Stems, the 
trial court enforced the surrogacy contract, terminated Whitehead's parental 
118Id. at 367. 
119 Id. at 361. 
12°Id. The dissent, however, saw Thomas' petition as an all-or-nothing approach 
and wrote that once the paternity declaration is granted, even if Thomas is not awarded 
visitation, "the constant, frightening potential for it is a burden that this child, who is 
already aware that her family is vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts, should not 
have to bear." !d. at 368 (Ellerin, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. at 361. 
122 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988). 
123Id. at 1235. 
124 I d. at 1236. 
125Id. 
126 Id. at 1236-37. 
127Id. 
128Id. 
129Id. 
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rights, granted Mrs. Stem's adoption petition, and further awarded custody of 
Melissa to the Stems. 130 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, held that surrogacy contracts 
for money are invalid because they conflict with existing statutes and public 
policy.131 As a result, the court found that the surrogacy contract's provision 
requiring termination of Whitehead's parental rights violated New Jersey law 
and was unenforceable. 132 In addition, because the termination of Whitehead's 
parental rights was invalid, Mrs. Stem's adoption of Melissa was similarly 
invalid. 133 Once the surrogacy contract was deemed invalid and the court 
determined that there was no lawful basis upon which to terminate 
Whitehead's parental rights, the court proceeded to determine custody of 
Melissa and noted that this was a custody dispute between two couples whose 
I . . I d I· h 134 C alms were entlt e to equa welg t. 
The court awarded custody of Melissa to the Stems 135 and visitation rights 
to Whitehead "at some point" to be determined by the trial court on remand. 136 
Whitehead's parental rights were not terminated, although certainly she had 
fewer rights than she had hoped to have at the conclusion of these proceedings. 
Mrs. Stem was granted joint custody of Melissa with her husband, but she was 
not entitled to adopt Melissa nor establish legal parentage. Ideally, Mrs. Stem 
would have been able to adopt Melissa and establish a full legal parent-child 
relationship while still affording Whitehead some ability to pursue limited 
visitation with Melissa in the future. Strict adherence to the two-parent 
paradigm did not necessarily best protect Melissa, who is being raised by a 
parent without full parental rights (and further denies Melissa the rights that 
flow from legal parentage, such as certain benefits, inheritance, and the like). 
Each of the cases above illustrates a scenario in which the actions of more 
than two adults resulted in the birth of a child, and those adults had differing 
degrees of involvement with that child after birth. Courts in these and other 
cases have, to some degree, disaggregated parental rights to recognize the 
presence of the three adults. LaChappelle and Thomas were recognized as 
biological fathers and were granted limited visitation rights; Marybeth 
130 Jd. at 1237-38. 
131 Jd. at 1240. Specifically, the court held that the particular "contract 
conflict[ ed] with (1) laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions; 
(2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of 
parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of 
custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions." Jd. 
132 Jd. at 1242-44 (reviewing applicable statutes). 
133 !d. at 1244. 
134 Jd. at 1256. 
135 Jd. at 1259. 
136 Jd. at 1263. At the initial trial, a recommendation was made to preclude 
Whitehead from visiting Melissa for at least five years. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court noted that such a recommendation was highly unusual but that if the facts 
support a long suspension, it was to be ordered. !d. 
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Whitehead retained her parental rights, but was denied custody,137 in part due 
to fleeing with the child. Despite recognizing the parental rights of the 
biological parents in these cases, the courts did not also recognize parental 
rights in the nonbiological partner parent: Ohanian, Sandra R., and Elizabeth 
Stern were deemed to have certain custodial rights, but no legal parental status. 
The courts fudged the multiple parenthood issue and did not recognize legal 
parentage for more than two parents. In the next section, I discuss how courts 
should apply multiple parentage. 
B. Making De Facto Multiple Parenthood a Legal Reality-All Parents 
Are Not Equal 
Scholarly support for mUltiple parenthood is not new. In 1984, Professor 
Katharine Bartlett wrote a seminal article in which she challenged the 
exclusivity of parenthood. 138 In her article, Bartlett proposes the recognition of 
de facto parents and stresses the importance for children of continuity of 
relationships with adults who have served as their caretakers or with whom 
they have otherwise established an intimate bond. 139 Bartlett notes that 
concerns of broadening access to parenthood include "diluting the individual 
autonomy of parents" and "increas[ing] the number of adults making claim to a 
child and enhanc[ing] the indetenninacy that already exists in child custody 
law.,,140 In response to these concerns, Bartlett suggests limiting multiple 
parentage so that nonparents can exercise parental rights only when there has 
been an interruption in the child's relationship with her legal parent. 141 In this 
way, Bartlett does not advocate multiple parenthood in which the full panoply 
of parental rights for more than two parents is simultaneously recognized. 
Professor Alison Young has also advocated for a reconception of family 
that goes beyond the traditional nuclear paradigm.142 Like Bartlett, Young 
describes the nuclear family as an exclusive family; unlike Bartlett, Young 
sees potential for a much more inclusive definition of family that recognizes a 
"core" and simultaneously embraces multiple individuals who have played a 
parenting or creation role in the child's life. 143 Young recognizes that there are 
many two-parent families that are not traditional nuclear families and that other 
individuals should be included within the family. By articulating a more 
inclusive vision of family, Young anticipates that numerous individuals can 
137 Whitehead was granted unsupervised visitation on remand. In re Baby M., 542 
A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). 
138 Bartlett, supra note I, at 883. 
139Id. at 944. 
140 !d. at 945. 
141 Id. at 946 ("Absent the failure of the premise of the nuclear family underlying 
traditional exclusive parenthood, the state should not intervene in families to create 
new parental rights.") 
142 Young, supra note 18, at 508-09. 
143Id. at 516-18. 
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participate in a child's upbringing. As a means by which to manage the 
relationships, Young recognizes a "core unit" or "parents" who have support 
obligations and the like but advocates permitting legal recognition of other 
individuals who "could generate significant links and support systems for 
children.,,144 With her principle of a core family unit, Young anticipates that a 
child can have more than two legal parents, but recognizes that one or two 
parents will generally have more decision-making authority than other parents. 
In considering the recognition of multiple parenthood, I suggest 
recognizing relative rights for parents, which is similar to Professor Young's 
proposal of recognizing a core family unit and additional parental figures. My 
premise, in essence, is that parents who contribute more caretaking should 
have a greater say in custody matters than parents who contribute less. While 
perhaps sounding unfair, that represents, to a large extent, our current custodial 
system for primary physical custodians after divorce or in the paternity 
context. Many parents share joint legal custody and have an equal say in 
decision making, but true joint physical custody is less common. A similar 
principle can apply to more than two parents. In the Ontario case discussed 
earlier,145 the lesbian couple with whom the child resides has greater daily 
decision-making authority than the father who is not a primary custodian. All 
three parents, however, have their parental status legally recognized. 146 
For multiple parenthood to work, definitions of parent beyond biology 
and adoption must become the norm. I do not mean to suggest that every child 
should have nonbiological or nonadoptive parents or that every child should 
have more than two parents, but rather, when families do not comport with the 
traditional nuclear family, I advocate that courts confer legal parentage on 
people who have functioned as parents and/or intended to be parents. In the 
case of anonymous gamete donation~ I argue that some status should be 
recognized, but that in the absence of a parenting plan or agreement, the 
genetic donor should have limited rights, which I address in the next section. 
The ALI Principles provide a good starting place for defining parentage 
beyond biology and adoption. The Principles are not perfect, as they also 
employ certain bright-line rules for defining parent by estoppel and de facto 
parenthood, especially in regard to the length of time an individual has resided 
with the child. Yet adoption of the Principles, or a modified version, is 
attractive in that the Principles recognize several categories of parents and 
render many traditionally nonlegal parental care givers as legal parents. In 
addition to traditional legal parentage established by biology or adoption, the 
ALI confers parental status on parents by estoppel147 and de facto parents. 148 
144 !d. at 518. 
145 A.A. v. 8.B., 2007 O.A.c. 2, Docket Number C39998, at 2. 
1461d. at 12-13. 
147 A parent by estoppel is one who, with the agreement of a legal parent or 
parents, has lived with the child since birth, or for at least two years if not since birth, 
and has assumed full parenting responsibilities. For a complete definition of parent by 
estoppel, see supra note 78. 
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Parents by estoppel have greater rights than de facto parents and are treated on 
par with legal parents. 149 
The ALI Principles not only envision a more inclusive model of family, 
they specifically contemplate the possibility of multiple parentage. 150 For 
example, part of the definition of a parent by estoppel includes establishing 
that relationship if a person "lived with the child for at least two years, holding 
out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to 
an agreement with the child's parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both 
parents).,,151 A comment to the ALI Principles also notes that parent by 
estoppel status should be recognized only when it is in the child's best 
interests. 152 Further comments caution that if a child already has two legal 
parents, the case for recognizing an additional parent is weaker, but the court 
must consider the strength of emotional bonds to the child. 153 The ALI 
Principles thus address the express possibility of recognizing more than two 
legal parents. Furthermore, the ALI Principles contemplate that a biological 
parent may not be a legal parent but can have an agreement with the legal 
parent or parents under which s/he reserves certain parental rights or 
responsibilities. 154 This disaggregation of parental rights recognizes the 
importance of the biological connection between a parent and child, and 
further recognizes parenthood for more than two individuals. 
An advantage of adopting the ALI definitions of parent is that persons 
meeting the criteria of parent by estoppel and de facto parent will have 
standing to pursue custody and visitation claims, will not be seen as third-party 
legal strangers, and can overcome the hurdle of parental autonomy because 
they will be within the legally recognized family circle. 155 A second advantage 
148 A de facto parent is also a person who has lived with the child for at least two 
years and, with the agreement of the legal parent or as a result of the legal parent to 
perform care taking functions, has regularly cared for the child. For a complete 
definition of de facto parent, see supra note 79. 
149 "A parent by estoppel is afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent under 
this Chapter, including . . . the benefit of the presumptive allocation of custodial 
time ... and priority over a de Jacto parent and a nonparent in the allocation oj 
primary custodial responsibility . ... " ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.03( 1 )(b) (emphasis added). 
150 "The ALI's approach creates the possibility that a child might have three or 
more parents all at the same time." Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and Constitutional 
Substance oj Parenthood in RECONCEIVING THE F AMIL Y: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTES PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISOLUTION, supra note 89, at 
47,5l. 
151 ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) (emphasis added). 
152 !d. § 2.03(1 )(b) cmt.. 
153 Id. 
154Id. § 2.04(1)(d). 
155 The ALI Principles provide that legal parents, parents by estoppel, and de 
facto parents are parties entitled to bring an action and are similarly entitled "to be 
notified of and participate as a party in an action filed by another." Id. § 2.04(1). 
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of the definitions is a recognition of relative rights of the parents. Under the 
ALI Principles, parents by estoppel have rights equivalent to those of legal 
parents. 156 De facto parents, however, have rights secondary to legal parents 
and parents by estoppel in the context of custodial decision making. 157 While 
still recognized as parents, de facto parents' rights to custody are subordinate 
to legal parents and parents by estoppel. 
All of the approaches to multiple parenthood discussed above rely on 
broadened definitions of parent and an acknowledgment that children may 
have more than two parents. Even though de facto parents do not have rights 
equal to legal parents or parents by estoppel, they are stiII entitled to bring 
custody and/or visitation actions, are entitled to notice of proceedings, and are 
thus within the purview of parental preference and are not relegated to third-
party status. Multiple parenthood does not necessarily mean "full" parental 
rights for more than two parents; it does provide children and caregivers with 
continuity of relationships and a protection of the relationship, even if the 
relationship is not a primary custodial relationship. 
C. All "Parents" Are Not Parents Entitled to Parental Rights 
All parents are not equally entitled to the full panoply of parental rights. 
In rethinking parentage and the various attributes of parentage, it is important 
to also consider those individuals who might properly be denied certain 
parental rights, such as spenn and egg donors. The UP A provides that spenn 
and egg donors have no parental rights regarding the children born from use of 
the spenn or egg. One of the main reasons for this is the concern of the 
intended parents that the biological father or mother wiII seek custodial or 
156 See supra note 147. 
157 For example, section 2.08 "Allocation of Custodial Responsibility," and 
section 2.09 "Allocation of Significant Decisionmaking Responsibility" both refer to 
legal parents and parents by estoppel, but do not address the rights of de facto parents 
to shared custody. Similarly, section 2.09(4) specifically authorizes that even if a legal 
parent or parent by estoppel is not allocated decision-making responsibility, "any legal 
parent and any parent by estoppel should have access to the child's school and health-
care records to which legal parents have access by other law .... " ALI PRINCIPLES § 
2.09(4). 
Moreover, section 2.21 (l) "Allocations of Responsibility to Individuals Other 
Than Legal Parents" provides that a court "should not allocate the majority of custodial 
responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority of custodial responsibility" 
unless the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not performed a reasonable share of 
parenting or "the available alternatives would cause harm to the child," and "it should 
limit or deny an allocation otherwise to be made if, in light of the number of other 
individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would be impractical in light 
of the objectives of this Chapter." ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.21. 
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visitation rights with the child and interfere with their parental autonomy.158 
Disaggregating rights to recognize the biological tie of the sperm or egg donor, 
while still preserving the legal rights of the intended parent(s), requires further 
research and exploration. In framing a dialogue about parentage and roles, 
however, we must consider the role biology should play in conferring or 
denying some sort of protected status. There are legitimate reasons to deny 
custody and visitation to sperm and egg donors who have contracted away 
those rights and then change their mind, or donors who donate genetic material 
on the condition of anonymity and the assurance of no parental responsibility. 
An issue that requires more research is the effect on donor-conceived children 
and their rights to know their genetic parent(s). 
The issue of whether sperm and egg donors should have anonymity is a 
source of current debate. While some fertility experts are in favor of anonymity 
to protect customers from being caught up in potential custody battles, other 
customers would like access to donor information, both for genetic medical 
history purposes as well as giving children the opportunity to contact their 
genetic parent and learn more about their genetic identity.159 One journalist has 
commented that " ... it's wrong when an industry stokes the genetic anxieties 
of would-be parents yet fails to provide the support to help us all figure out 
how to deal with the ways in which genetics do affect family ties.,,160 
The impact of anonymous donations on the children who are born from 
sperm and egg donation is just being realized. In a particularly compelling 
article, Katrina Clark, an eighteen-year-old college student conceived through 
sperm donation, writes: 
I was angry at the idea that where donor conception is concerned, everyone 
focuses on the "parents"-the adults who can make choices about their own 
lives. The recipient gets sympathy for wanting to have a child. The donor 
gets a guarantee of anonymity and absolution from any responsibility for the 
offspring of his "donation." As long as these adults are happy, then donor 
conception is a success, right? 
Not so. The children born of these transactions are people, too. Those of us 
in the first documented generation of donor babies--conceived in the late 
1980s and early '90s, when sperm banks became more common and donor 
insemination began to flourish-are coming of age, and we have something 
to say. 
I'm here to tell you that emotionally, many of us are not keeping up. We 
didn't ask to be born into this situation, with its limitations and confusion. 
It's hypocritical of parents and medical professionals to assume that 
158 See e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); Lamaritata v. 
Lucas, 823 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (distinguishing sperm donor from 
"parent" with standing to seek visitation). 
159 Amy Harmon, Are You My Sperm Donor? Few Clinics Will Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 2006, at AI. 
160 Liza Mundy, It's All in the Genes, Except When It Isn't, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 
2006, at Bl. 
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biological roots won't matter to the "products" of the cryobanks' service, 
when the longing for a biological relationship is what brings customers to 
the banks in the first place. 161 
337 
Ms. Clark's poignant telling of her experience searching for her biological 
father is similar to the experiences of many adopted children who seek to know 
their genetic history. And as birth registries and "open adoption" become more 
widely accepted, it is useful to consider similar registries for children born 
from anonymous sperm or egg donors. 162 
In the paternity context, Professor Cynthia Mabry has voiced concern that 
children have access to their genetic identity, arguing that: "Children gain a 
fuller sense of self-esteem and identity when they know their parentage.,,163 I, 
too, have previously argued that even if biological fathers are not granted full 
parental rights, they should have some limited access to the child and the child 
to them, for purposes of preserving genetic connection and identity.164 Ms. 
Clark's story makes clear the importance to children of knowing their genetic 
identity. The family law and medical communities are just starting to 
understand the emotional impact on donor-conceived children. We have 
already put in place legal mechanisms by which to protect intended parents and 
donors, but we should also put in place mechanisms which protect children. 
While it is possible to maintain the current legal regime in which sperm and 
egg donors are not granted any parental rights or obligations with respect to 
custody and child support, perhaps donors should be required to provide 
contact information, health histories, and perhaps even a picture. 
I am not suggesting that a sperm or egg donor should assume all of the 
rights and responsibilities of parentage: ART is often predicated on the 
assumption that the donor and the mother or couple agree that the donor is not 
a parent entitled to custody or required to pay support. But as Ms. Clark 
highlights, it is unfair to children born through ART to completely eliminate 
the genetic donor. Disaggregating biological parentage from legal parentage 
would enable children to have access to information about their background 
while providing assurances to legal parents that their ability to raise their child 
161 Katrina Clark, My Father Was an Anonymous Sperm Donor, WASH. POST, 
Sunday, Dec. 17, 2006, at BO I. 
162 Young, supra note 18, at 549-53 (discussing a registry for open adoption in 
several Canadian provinces and describing how a similar system could apply to sperm 
donors). 
163 Cynthia R. Mabry, Who is the Baby's Daddy (And Why is it ImportantJor the 
Child to Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 211,238 (2005). Writing about mothers who do 
not reveal information pertaining to their child's fathers, Mabry argues that the child 
suffers and feels embarrassed: "They suffer when they yearn to know not only their 
father's identity but also him as a person." Id. 
164 Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 3, at 822 ("[T]o reject biology as a basis of 
parenthood ... completely ignores the importance of genetic identity and heritage ... 
for a child.") 
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as they see fit is not compromised. One option is a system whereby genetic 
parents can provide information about their medical histories, contact 
information, and the like, such as adoption registries. A registry system would 
permit donor-conceived children to learn more about their genetic identity and 
history without causing an undue burden on the parents' custodial rights. 
Another option is to contractually permit the biological parent to retain 
limited rights, but not the right to custody.165 As noted above, the ALI 
Principles recognize the possibility of limited parental rights for biological 
parents while permitting other persons to assume full legal parental status. 166 
Unfortunately, the current two-parent paradigm may exacerbate tensions 
between donors and users because of the all-or-nothing aspect of parentage. 
Preserving biological parentage to provide the child with access to her history 
and identity, should become the norm and not the exception. Legislative 
acceptance of multiple categories of parent, such as embraced by the ALI, 
would enable judges more latitude to recognize the particular contributions of 
particular parents and accord the appropriate deference depending upon the 
degree of parent-child relationship that has been established. Such a system 
would provide greater guidance to parties using ART and enable them to craft 
arrangements that better serve all parties' needs and, hopefully, avoid 
litigation. 
The LaChappelle and Thomas S. cases discussed earlier illustrate courts 
that have adjudicated parentage but denied custodial rights; a system in which 
judges disaggregate the rights of parentage to confer legal parentage and 
limited rights, but specifically deny custodial rights, would assure the other 
legal parent(s) that they will not lose custody. While this may seem an 
infringement on the parents' rights, the child's interests should be paramount. 
As Justice Stevens explained in his Troxel dissent, the child's liberty interest in 
continuing a relationship should not be pushed aside for a rigid adherence to 
parental autonomy. 167 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal recognition of multiple parenthood recognizes the de facto reality of 
many families. Multiple parenthood permits children to benefit from 
maintaining relationships with long-term or intended caregivers and to have 
the ability to know their genetic identity and background. Redefinition 
embraces multiple models of family, not merely the traditional two-parent 
nuclear family. Broader definitions of parentage enable courts to recognize 
more than two parents for a child. 
165 See cases cited supra notes 99-121 and accompanying text (discussing 
LaChappelle and Thomas s., in which known sperm donors were legal fathers without 
full custodial rights). 
166 See supra text accompanying note 155. 
167 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88-90 (2000) (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
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Disaggregating parental rights allows courts to balance multiple parental 
interests and accord weight to parents based on their demonstrated 
commitment to the child. Most importantly, disaggregation of parental rights to 
recognize multiple parentage provides children with more continuous 
relationships with caregivers, access to their genetic history, and protection of 
their nontraditional families. 
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